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_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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a/k/a Rasul el-bey 
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                       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 11-cr-119-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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Before:   JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and 
RAKOFF*, Senior District Judge. 
 
(Filed: June 21, 2013) 
_______________ 
 
Michael N. Huff 
1333 Race Street 
Philadelphia, PA   19107 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Zane D. Memeger 
Robert Zauzmer 
Andrew J. Schell 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street – Ste. 1250 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Lee Graves appeals the judgment of conviction and 
sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the 
 
_______________ 
  * Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court 
Senior Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by 
designation.
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania on May 31, 2012.  He 
contends that his conviction must be reversed because his 
rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq., 
were violated.  As there was no such violation, we will 
affirm.   
 
I. Background 
 
 On March 2, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment 
charging Graves with one count of attempted possession of 
500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846.  He was arraigned on March 31, 2011, at which time 
the presiding magistrate judge decided that Graves should be 
evaluated to see whether he was competent to stand trial.  The 
following day, the District Court entered an order instructing 
the Bureau of Prisons to conduct a psychiatric examination 
and mental competency evaluation of Graves, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 4241(b).  That evaluation was still pending on 
June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled 
to occur.  The District Court therefore issued an order 
continuing the case until the filing of the competency report.       
 
 On June 22, 2011, the Bureau of Prisons completed the 
report, which concluded that Graves was competent to stand 
trial.  The report was mailed to the magistrate judge with a 
cover letter dated June 28, 2011, and it was apparently 
received on July 7, 2011.
1
  On September 21, 2011, the 
                                              
 
1
  Graves claims that the report was received by the 
magistrate judge on July 11, 2011.  Although the District 
Court mentioned that date during the hearing on Graves’s 
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District Court held a status hearing, during which it reviewed 
the report and ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial.  
It also appointed defense counsel, who immediately moved 
for a continuance to allow adequate time to prepare for trial.  
On September 26, 2011, the Court granted that motion and set 
Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012.   
 
 Only weeks after seeking the continuance, however, 
Graves moved on October 21, 2011, to dismiss the 
indictment.  He claimed that more than 70 days of 
inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the 
indictment, which he argued violated his rights under the 
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., the Speedy Trial 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.  The District Court held a hearing 
on the motion and concluded that the time between March 31, 
2011, when the competency evaluation was ordered, and 
September 21, 2011, when the competency determination was 
made, was excluded from the speedy trial calculation.  It 
further held that the time after the September 21 hearing was 
also excluded due to defense counsel’s request for a 
continuance.  The Court therefore found that Graves’s speedy 
trial rights had not been violated.       
 
 Graves’s trial began as scheduled on February 27, 
2012.  He was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in 
prison and eight years of supervised release.  He then filed 
this appeal.   
                                                                                                     
Speedy Trial Act motion, it also mentioned July 7, and, when 
Graves’s counsel asked for clarification, the Court repeated 
that the report was received on July 7.  The reference to July 
11 appears to have merely been a misstatement.   
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II. Discussion
2
 
 
 The Speedy Trial Act (the “Act”) requires that, in a 
case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, a defendant’s 
trial must begin within 70 days of the public filing of the 
indictment or the defendant’s appearance before a judicial 
officer of the court, whichever is later.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(c)(1).  The Act also provides for the exclusion of 
certain periods of delay from the 70-day calculation.  Id. 
§ 3161(h).  Most relevant here, it excludes the “delay 
resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to 
determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the 
defendant.”  Id. § 3161(h)(1)(A).  The Act also excludes the 
“delay resulting from any pretrial motion,” id. 
§ 3161(h)(1)(D), and up to 30 days of delay when “any 
proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under 
advisement by the court,” id. § 3161(h)(1)(H).  Finally, the 
Act excludes periods of delay “resulting from a continuance 
granted by any judge,” as long as the judge has found “that 
the ends of justice” served by the continuance “outweigh the 
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”  
Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A).  We have held that “the days on which 
[excludable] events occurred” are not included “in making the 
70-day calculation.”  Gov’t of V.I. v. Duberry, 923 F.2d 317, 
320 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991).      
                                              
 
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “[W]e exercise plenary 
review over [a] district court’s construction of the [Speedy 
Trial] Act and its provisions on excludable time,” and we 
review its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. 
Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 870 (3d Cir. 1992).       
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 Graves’s sole argument on appeal is that the District 
Court erred in concluding that fewer than the 70 days 
permitted by the Speedy Trial Act passed between the filing 
of the indictment and his trial.
3
  He concedes that the 
March 31, 2011 request for a competency determination 
began a period of excludable delay, but he argues that that 
period ended on June 22, 2011, when the Bureau of Prisons 
completed the competency report.  He thus identifies 118 
days of inexcusable delay – 29 that lapsed between his 
indictment and the March 31 arraignment, and another 89 that 
passed between the completion of the competency report and 
the September 21 hearing, at which his counsel’s request for a 
continuance prompted another period of excludable delay.
4
  
Because that delay is greater than the 70 days permitted by 
the Speedy Trial Act, Graves argues that the District Court 
should have dismissed the indictment.  The government 
disagrees, contending that the District Court was correct to 
conclude that the period of excludable delay for Graves’s 
competency determination continued until the September 21 
status hearing, when the Court considered the report and 
                                              
 
3
  Graves has effectively abandoned his claims under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as he does not mention 
them in his brief on appeal.    
 
4
  That calculation is not entirely accurate.  Only 28 
days of non-excludable time passed between the March 2 
indictment and the March 31 arraignment, as neither of those 
dates should be included in the total.  Duberry, 923 F.2d at 
320 n.8.  Ninety days, however, passed between June 22 and 
September 21, meaning that the total of 118 days would in 
fact be correct, if Graves were correct about what is and is not 
excludable.   
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made its competency ruling.  The question before us is 
therefore whether a “delay resulting from” a competency 
proceeding extends until a hearing addressing the defendant’s 
competence is held, or just until the completion of a 
competency report.  This issue appears to be one of first 
impression for us.   
 
 To resolve the issue, we turn first to the language of 
the Speedy Trial Act, which excludes the “delay resulting 
from any proceeding, including any examinations, to 
determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the 
defendant.”  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A).  By making clear that 
the time spent examining the defendant is included in the 
delay attributed more generally to a competency proceeding, 
that provision indicates that such a proceeding involves more 
than just the competency examination itself.  Furthermore, the 
use of the term “proceeding” suggests judicial involvement, 
not solely the collection of evidence.  See Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1241 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “proceeding” as, 
inter alia, “[t]he business conducted by a court or other 
official body; a hearing”).  The plain language of the Act 
therefore indicates that the excludable delay under 
§ 3161(h)(1)(A) continues beyond the completion of the 
Bureau of Prisons competency report, which, important 
though it is, is only one step in determining a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.              
 
 That conclusion is consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 4241, 
the statute regarding competency determinations.  Section 
4241 “provides a mandatory process” that is “intended to 
culminate in a record-based judicial determination of 
competence.”  United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 680 
(3d Cir. 1998).  The prescribed process imposes a duty on the 
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court to order a competency hearing whenever “there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant” is mentally 
incompetent, id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)), as the 
magistrate judge apparently found to be the case here.  The 
court may then order a psychiatric examination of the 
defendant in order to “provide evidence for the hearing.”  Id.; 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) (“Prior to the date of the 
hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or 
psychological examination of the defendant be conducted … 
.”).   After the hearing, the court must determine whether, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, “the defendant is presently 
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent” to proceed to trial.  Id. § 4241(d).  
Section 4241 thus suggests that a hearing is a vital part of a 
“proceeding … to determine the mental competency” of the 
defendant.  Id. § 3161(h)(1)(A).   
 
 The Speedy Trial Act does not limit the amount of 
time that may be spent on a competency proceeding.  In fact, 
it provides that “[a]ny period of delay” for a competency 
proceeding “shall be excluded” from the 70-day calculation.  
Id. § 3161(h)(1).  That broad language is in contrast with the 
language in a different subsection of the Act, § 3161(h)(6), 
which provides for the exclusion of a “reasonable period of 
delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a 
codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run … .”  
The reasonableness requirement in subsection (h)(6) is absent 
from most of the other excludable delay provisions,
5
 and the 
                                              
 
5
  The other provisions that expressly include a 
reasonableness requirement are subsection (h)(1)(F), which 
provides that “any time consumed in excess of ten days” due 
to transportation of the defendant is “presumed to be 
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Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States has taken that 
absence as an indication that Congress intended the exclusion 
of the periods defined in those other provisions to be 
“automatic.”  476 U.S. 321, 327 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, when it turns out that a hearing is 
necessary to resolve a pretrial motion, the entire period before 
the hearing is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculation, 
regardless of whether the delay was reasonable.  Id. at 329-
30.  Although in Henderson the Supreme Court was 
considering the particular exclusion for “delay resulting from 
any pretrial motion,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), the language 
in the exclusion for competency proceedings is equally broad, 
see id. § 3161(h)(1)(A).  Therefore, the Court’s reasoning is 
persuasive here as well, and it suggests that all delays 
attributable to a competency proceeding, reasonable or not, 
are excluded from the 70-day calculation. 
 
 Based on that precedent and on the statutory language 
itself, we conclude that the period of excludable delay under 
§ 3161(h)(1)(A) begins when a party moves for, or the court 
sua sponte orders, a competency determination.  The 
excluded time continues at least until a competency hearing is 
held, which occurred here on the same date that the District 
Court rendered its competency determination.
6
  In other 
                                                                                                     
unreasonable,” and subsection (h)(1)(H), which excludes 
delays “reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed 
thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the 
defendant is actually under advisement by the court.”   
 
6
 Because the District Court made its competency 
determination at the hearing, we need not resolve the question 
of when a post-hearing delay may also be excluded.  We note, 
however, that in Henderson the Supreme Court held that 
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words, the period between a request for a competency 
                                                                                                     
§ 3161(h)(1)(D) “excludes time after a hearing has been held 
where a district court awaits additional filings from the parties 
that are needed for proper disposition of the motion.”  476 
U.S. at 331 (interpreting § 3161(h)(1)(F), which is now 
codified at § 3161(h)(1)(D)).  The Court explained that “[i]t 
would not have been sensible for Congress to exclude 
automatically all the time prior to the hearing on a motion and 
30 days after the motion is taken under advisement, but not 
the time during which the court remains unable to rule 
because it is awaiting the submission by counsel of additional 
materials.”  Id.  Thus, at a minimum, the delay due to a 
competency determination would likely remain excluded 
from the Speedy Trial calculation until the district court has 
received all papers and evidence needed to make that 
determination.  The extent to which it extends beyond that 
point depends on whether § 3161(h)(1)(H) limits the amount 
of time a court can have the issue of competency under its 
advisement.  That is an issue of statutory interpretation we 
need not reach here.   
 We also need not, and do not, resolve the issue of 
whether an unreasonable delay in the transportation of a 
defendant to a competency examination is excludable.  That 
issue has arisen in other cases due to § 3161(h)(1)(F).  See, 
e.g., United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 
2009) (considering whether a delay in transporting a 
defendant to a mental competency examination beyond the 
ten day limit is excludable).  That provision is not at issue 
here, and thus we do not reach the question of what impact it 
may have on delays for competency proceedings under 
§ 3161(h)(1)(A).    
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examination and a hearing addressing that issue is clearly part 
of the “delay resulting from any proceeding … to determine 
the mental competency or physical capacity of the 
defendant,” and therefore is “excluded … in computing the 
time within which the trial … must commence.”  Id. 
§ 3161(h)(1)(A); see also United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 
F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ll delays caused by 
proceedings to determine a defendant’s competency are 
excluded, except for the time during which the defendant is 
supposed to be in transit, which is presumptively 
unreasonable if longer than ten days.”); United States v. 
Stephens, 489 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district 
court correctly concluded that [the defendant’s] motion for a 
competency evaluation stopped the clock from the date it was 
filed … through the date the court ruled that [he] was 
competent to stand trial … .”); United States v. Noone, 913 
F.2d 20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1990) (excluding the “entire period” 
from when the motion to determine competency was filed 
through the date of the competency ruling, other than an 
unreasonable delay in transporting the defendant to the 
competency examination); United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 
329, 333 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Since the delays here complained 
of by [the defendant] arose from proceedings to determine his 
competency and were prior to the conclusion of the hearing 
thereon, they must be excluded from the calculation of the 
speedy trial clock whether or not they are reasonable.”).7      
                                              
 
7
  Only the Eighth Circuit has held differently, 
calculating the time excluded as 30 days from the district 
court’s receipt of the competency report.  United States v. 
Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).  The court based 
that holding on its conclusion that “the trial court had the 
discretion to hold or to forgo” a competency hearing.  Id. at 
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 The District Court utilized the approach we now 
endorse, and we therefore can discern no error in its 
interpretation and application of the Speedy Trial Act.  As all 
parties agree, the time between the indictment and the 
arraignment is not excluded under the Act.  Accordingly, 28 
of the 70 permitted days had passed before the magistrate 
judge ordered a competency examination on March 31, 2011.  
That order began a period of excludable “delay resulting from 
[a] proceeding … to determine the mental competency … of 
the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A), which continued 
until the September 21, 2011 hearing, at which the District 
Court considered the evidence of competency and rendered a 
decision.  Although that decision ended the competency 
proceeding, and thus terminated that particular period of 
excludable delay, a new period immediately began because 
Graves’s counsel requested a continuance, which the Court 
found served the ends of justice.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(7)(A).  Therefore, only the initial 28 days counted 
toward the speedy trial calculation.  As that period is well 
within the 70 days provided by the Speedy Trial Act, the 
                                                                                                     
1309.  That conclusion relied on a previous version of the 
competency statute, id., which required a hearing only if a 
competency examination “indicates a state of present insanity 
or … mental incompetency in the accused,” see United States 
v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72, 74 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972) (quoting the 
prior version of the statute, then codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4244) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As discussed above, we 
have held that the current version provides for a “mandatory 
process” that involves a hearing in all instances in which 
competency is at issue.  Haywood, 155 F.3d at 680.  
Accordingly, we decline to follow the approach adopted in 
Jones.  
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District Court rightly held that Graves’s rights under the Act 
were not violated.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 Because Graves’s trial began within the time allotted 
under the Speedy Trial Act, the District Court did not err in 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm.      
